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Labor Relations 
by Joseph R. Grodin* 
One of my colleagues, upon hearing of this endeavor, asked 
how I could write a chapter on developments in California 
labor law when there aren't any. Presumably, what he meant 
was that the field is so occupied by federal regulations that 
there is little room for development on a state level. His point, 
though exaggerated, is well taken. 
The Labor Management Relations Ace covers a broad 
range of activities which affect interstate commerce, declaring 
some to be protected and prohibiting others as unfair labor 
practices, and vests the National Labor Relations Board with 
jurisdiction to make determinations and provide remedies. 
According to the pre-emption doctrine as declared by the 
United States Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the NLRB 
* B.A. 1951, University of California, 
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School. Ph.D. 1959, London University. 
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1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq. 
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is exclusive, in both substance and remedy. Whenever an 
activity is "arguably" protected or prohibited by the federal 
act, courts (both state and federal) must yield. 2 Since there 
are few matters in the labor field which are not reasonably 
arguable, the pre-emptive effect is substantial. 
The LMRA does vest federal courts with original juris-
diction in certain matters, principally the enforcement of 
collective bargaining agreements under section 3013 and the 
provision of damages for certain unfair labor practices under 
section 303.4 State courts are held to exercise jurisdiction con-
currently.5 In suits brought in state courts under section 301, 
the courts are bound to apply principles and precedents of 
federallaw,6 subject to Supreme Court review.7 Thus, within 
the perimeters of the LMRA, for both jurisdiction and sub-
stantive rules, federal law predominates. 
This does not mean, however, that developments in labor 
law at the state level are without significance. It is state 
courts which must determine their jurisdiction in particular 
cases, and, subject to Supreme Court review, such decisions 
playa major role in shaping the extent and application of 
the pre-emption doctrine. With respect to those cases in 
which they may assert concurrent jurisdiction with federal 
courts, state courts are frequently called upon to exercise 
judicial creativity on questions where federal principles, 
though theoretically applicable, are virtually nonexistent.s 
2. San Diego Building Trades Coun-
cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d 
775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959). 
3. The union party to the agreement 
must be one which represents employ-
ees in an industry affecting commerce as 
defined in the act. 
4. Section 303 incorporates by refer-
ence section 8(b)(4) of the Act, which 
makes it all unfair labor practice for a 
union to engage in certain activity, prin-
cipally secondary boycotts and jurisdic-
tional (work assignment) disputes. 
These are the only unfair labor prac-
tices for which the Act provides judicial 
relief through damage suits. 
5'40 CAL LAW 1969 
5. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles 
County District Council, 49 Ca1.2d 45, 
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. den. 355 
U.S. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 415, 78 S.Ct. 413. 
6. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 
735, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. [1967]) 
cert. granted 389 U.S. 819, 19 L.Ed.2d 
68, 88 S.Ct. 103 (1967), affd. 390 U.S. 
557, 20 L.Ed.2d 126, 88 S.Ct. 1235. 
7. Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 
369 U.S. 95, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 82 S.Ct. 
571 (1961); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 
368 U.S. 502, 7 L.Ed.2d 483, 82 S.Ct. 
519 (1961). 
8. The Supreme Court has said: 
"The range of judicial inventiveness will 
2
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Finally, there are situations and areas in which neither the pre-
emption principles nor the judiCial uniformity principle pre-
clude the application of state law by state courts or agencies. 
This may be the case, for example: (1) where the impact upon 
interstate commerce is so slight that the NLRB has declined 
to assert jurisdiction or has indicated by published rule or 
decision that it would decline;9 (2) where the particular 
employment relationship is excluded from coverage under 
the Act (as with farm laboeo and public employees); or (3) 
where the subject matter is deemed to be of "merely peripheral 
concern"ll of the Act but of substantial concern under state 
policy, such as the regulation of violence or mass picketing, 
or in litigation over exclusively internal union affairs.12 
Application of the Pre-Emption Principle 
In earlier years, perhaps the principal contribution of the 
California courts to the pre-emption doctrine was in providing 
opinions which the United States Supreme Court struck down 
in the landmark Garmon13 cases. Recently, however, Cali-
fornia courts have fully accepted the implications of the pre-
be determined by the nature of the 
problem. . . . Federal interpreta-
tion of the federal law will govern, not 
state law. . . . But state law, if 
compatible with the purpose of § 301, 
may be resorted to in order to find the 
rule that will best effectuate the federal 
policy. . . . Any state law applied, 
however, will be absorbed as federal law 
and will not be an independent source 
of private rights." Textile Workers Un-
ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 at 
457, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 at 981, 77 S.Ct. 
912 at 918 (1957). 
9. The NLRB has statutory authority 
to assert jurisdiction over unfair labor 
practices which "affect commerce", a 
term interpreted as coincident with the 
constitutional authority of congress to 
regulate interstate commerce. NLRB 
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 83 L.Ed. 
1014, 59 S.Ct. 688 (1938). It also has 
statutory authority by rule of decision 
or published rules to decline to assert 
jurisdiction where it feels the impact 
upon commerce is "not sufficiently sub-
stantial." LMRA § 14(c)(1). State 
courts and agencies are free to assert 
jurisdiction over cases so declined. 
§ 14(c)(2). 
10. LMRA § 2(3). 
11. LMRA § 2(2). 
12. For a recent statement of the 
"peripheral concern" exceptions, see 
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 17 L.Ed.2d 
842, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967). 
13. Garmon v. San Diego Building 
Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 
P.2d 1 (1955), revd, and remanded 
353 U.S. 26 1 L.Ed.2d 618, 77 S.Ct. 
607 (1957), 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d 
473 (1958) overruled 53 Cal.2d 475 (on 
remand) revd. 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d 
775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959). 
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emption principle, and some of the decisions break new 
ground. For example, on the difficult issue of NLRB dec-
lination, our supreme court held in Russell v. Electrical 
W orkers14 that, while resort to the NLRB should not be re-
quired when it would obviously be futile, the party seeking 
relief in a state court bears the burden of showing that the 
NLRB, on the basis of published rules and decisions, would 
decline to take the case. 
During 1968 the supreme court had occasion to amplify the 
Russell rule in two companion cases: Musicians Union v. 
Supreme Courtl& and Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical 
Stage Employees Union Local 16.16 Both cases involved in-
junctions against threatened union picketing to protest an 
employer's refusal to hire workmen whom the employer said he 
did not want or need. 
In the first case, Charles Finley, owner of the Oakland 
Athletics baseball club, proposed to hire a union organist and 
a 25-piece union band for the opening game between· the 
Athletics and the Baltimore Orioles, but the musicians union 
insisted that he employ a union band at all weekend games, as 
was the practice of other professional teams in the area. When 
Finley refused, the union denied its members permission to 
perform, placed pickets at the entrances to' the Oakland 
Coliseum, and threatened to continue picketing on opening 
night. Finley and the Coliseum obtained a temporary re-
straining order, and thereafter a preliminary injunction, re-
straining picketing at the Coliseum for any purpose relating to 
the hiring of musicians by Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. or 
others. The supreme court granted an alternative writ of 
prohibition restraining further proceedings in the action on 
the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue 
the injunction; and, after argument, the court ordered the is-
suance of a pre-emptory writ. 
Finley and the Coliseum advanced several reasons for 
14. 64 Cal.2d 22, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 16. 69 Ca1.2d -, 73 Cal. Rptr. 213, 
409 P.2d 926 (1966). 447 P.2d 325 (1968). 
15. 69 Cal.2d -, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201, 
447 P.2d 313 (1968). 
542 CAL LAW 1969 
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avoiding the pre-emption doctrine, each of which the supreme 
court rejected. First they argued that the operations of a 
baseball club, even though crossing state lines, should be 
regarded as outside the scope of the federal act by analogy 
to baseball's exemption from federal antitrust regulations. But 
the court held that exemption is based upon a judicial-legis-
lative history peculiar to the antitrust field and has no appli-
cation to the field of labor regulation, either by way of con-
stitutional limitation or congressional intent. 
Nor was the court prepared to speculate, as did respondents, 
that the NLRB would choose to decline jurisdiction over a 
baseball club. While it was true that the board had never 
asserted jurisdiction over a baseball club, it was also true that 
it had never declined to do so by "rule of decision" or "pub-
lished rule" within the meaning of section 14 ( c ) . While it had 
declined to assert jurisdiction over some segments of the 
sports and entertainment industries it had asserted jurisdiction, 
particularly in more recent cases, over others. Thus, since 
there had been no prior resort to the NLRB, Finley and the 
Coliseum failed to sustain the burden, placed upon them by 
Russell, of establishing that the board would not hear the 
cause. 
Even if the NLRB would assert jurisdiction over the busi-
ness operations of the Oakland Atheltics, it was argued, the 
pre-emption principle is inapplicable because the threatened 
picketing by the union, which had no prior dealings with the 
ball club and which represented none of its current employees, 
was simply outside the scope of the Act, either by way of 
protection or prohibition. But, as the court pointed out, the 
Act's definition of "employee" includes any employee, and 
not only the employees of a particular employer /7 and its 
definition of "labor dispute" includes "any controversy con-
cerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or con-
cerning the association or representation of persons in 
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of 
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of 
17. LMRA § 2(3). 
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employer and employee.,,18 Thus with reference to the ob-
jective sought, the union's picketing to obtain employment 
opportunity for its members, while not prohibited by section 
8 of the Act, was "arguably" protected as a "concerted 
activity" for employees' "mutual aid or protection" under 
section 7.19 At the same time, the means by which the 
picketing was conducted, according to the allegations of one 
complaint, "arguably" violated the secondary boycott pro-
scriptions in section 8 by failing to conform to the board's 
requirements for picketing a "situs" occupied by both a "pri-
mary" employer (Finley) and a "neutral" or "secondary" em-
ployer (Coliseum), and thereby illegally inducing a secondary 
work stoppage. Whether the picketing was in fact pro-
tected or prohibited was a question for the NLRB, not the 
state court, to determine. 
Finley and the Coliseum next contended that the injunction 
was justified without reference to the pre-emption doctrine on 
the ground that it was necessary to protect public safety and 
order against the turmoil that would ensue if picketing were 
allowed, particularly on opening night. On this issue the 
court's opinion was most emphatic: 
The fact that holding the game in the face of the picketing 
might pose a threat to public safety and order does not 
convert peaceful picketing that the state may not enjoin 
into "the kind of mass picketing and overt threats of 
violence which under the Allen-Bradley local case give 
the state court jurisdiction". The picketing, 
peaceful in itself, would have caused the ensuing turmoil 
no more than Finley's decision to hold the game would 
have. It was for the Board, therefore, to regulate the 
economic struggle between Finley and petitioners. 2o 
18. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(9). workmen be employed, even though the 
19. While § 8(b)(6) of the Act pro- employer regards their work as re-
scribes union activity to obtain pay- dundant. NLRB v. Gamble Enter-
ment "in the nature of an exaction, for prises, 345 U.S. 117, 97 L.Ed. 864, 73 
services which are not performed or not S.Ct. 560 (1953). 
to be performed" that language has 20. 69 Cal.2d at -, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 
been held not to extend to demands that 211, 447 P.2d at 323. 
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Finally, it was asserted that the court had jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction in order to prevent trespass upon the prop-
erty of the Coliseum. It was on this issue that the court's 
opinion broke new ground for California. This question had 
been before the United States Supreme Court in Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats.l In this case the court 
struck down an injunction against picketing which was argua-
bly prohibited by the Act, and therefore not subject to state 
court jurisdiction, even though one of the grounds for the 
injunction had been that the picketing trespassed upon the 
employer's property; but at the same time the court left open 
the question of "whether a state may frame and enforce an 
injunction aimed narrowly at a trespass of this sort.,,2 
Several state courts have answered this question in the 
negative, on the ground that the trespass issue is inextricably 
related to board jurisdiction, and California now joins that 
company. "There may be circumstances", the court concedes, 
"in which the use of trespass laws in labor c6ntroversies would 
reach activities that would have 'no relevance to the board's 
function' " but in the instant case, where the injunction relies 
upon the law of trespass, "not to ensure public safety and 
order, but to institute ground rules governing the economic 
struggle betweeen the union and the real parties in interest", 
it trespasses upon the jurisdiction of the board. This is so 
because "the propriety of labor activity on private property has 
been a persistent issue in disputes before the Board, and the 
Board has the power in appropriate cases to authorize such 
activity. ,,3 
Consolidated Theatres, involved a quite similar pre-emption 
issue: whether a state court had jurisdiction to enjoin picket-
ing by the Stagehands Union to compel a moving picture 
theatre, when showing first-run pictures, to hire a maintenance 
man whom the theatre said it did not want or need. The 
court found the picketing to be arguably protected under 
1. 353 U.S. 20, 1 L.Ed.2d 613, 77 2. 353 U.S. at 24, 1 L.Ed.2d at 616, 
S.Ct. 604 (1957) reh. den. 353 U.S. 77 S.Ct. at 606. 
948, 1 L.Ed.2d 857, 77 S.Ct. 822 (1957). 3. 69 Cal.2d at -, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 
212, 447 P.2d at 324. 
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section 7 of the Act, not only because it was designed to 
create additional employment opportunities for members, (as 
in the Musicians Union case) but also because it served to 
protect existing jobs at other theatres against the threat by 
the owners of those theatres to eliminate maintenance men 
unless all first-run theatres were signed to the same require-
ment. The court also found the picketing to be arguably pro-
hibited by section 8(b)(6) of the Act, on the basis of evidence 
that maintenance men who were "employed" did little or no 
actual work. 311 
On the basis of the Russell rule, these findings provided 
sufficient basis to overturn the injunction unless the theatre had 
demonstrated through published regulations and decisions that 
the board would decline to assert jurisdiction; the court re-
fused to apply the Russell rule because the union did not 
raise the pre-emption argument at the trial level, and the trans-
cript was totally lacking in evidence on that point. It there-
fore remanded the case for trial, with instructions that it be 
dismissed if Consolidated does not bear its burden of showing 
board declination. 
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitration 
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act gives federal courts 
jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization which represents employees 
in an industry "affecting commerce" as defined in the Act; and, 
as previously noted, it has been held that state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction in such cases, subject to the applica-
tion of federal law. 
Section 301 includes the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate and of arbitration awards,4 matters which are covered 
extensively by California's Arbitration Act. 6 This Act pre· 
scribes the procedure for bringing peti tions to compel ar-
bitration, or to confirm, modify, or set aside arbitration awards. 
It includes time limits within which such action can be taken, 
3a. See footnote 19, supra, page 544. 5. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1280-
4. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 1294.2. 
353 U.S. 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 77 S.Ct. 
912 (1957). 
546 CAL LAW 1969 
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and also specifies the grounds upon which the petition should 
be granted or denied. There is serious question whether the 
Arbitration Act applies in cases subject to section 301 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. So far that question has not been 
squarely considered by the courts; indeed, it has been largely 
ignored. 
For example, under federal principles, an order to arbitrate 
a grievance is not to be denied "unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible 
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."6 Courts 
are precluded from inquiring into the merits of a dispute. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court held in John Wiley & Sons v. 
Livingston7 that so-called "procedural" issues, such as whether 
contractual grievance procedures leading to arbitration have 
been complied with, or excused, or whether unexcused failure 
to comply avoids the duty to arbitrate, cannot ordinarily be 
answered without consideration of the merits and should, 
therefore, be referred to the arbitrator. 
The California Arbitration Act is generally in accord with 
these principles, but section 1281.2 provides, inter alia, that 
an order to arbitrate should be denied if the court determines 
that the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the 
petitioner. 
In Martinez Typographical Union v. Silversun Corp.s a 
union sought to compel arbitration of a dispute,9 but the 
trial court denied relief on the basis of waiver, finding that the 
union had failed to request arbitration for a substantial period 
of time, even after notice that the company was about to sell 
its business. The union remained silent until after the sale 
had been consummated and the company no longer had the 
physical facilities with which to comply with the union's de-
mand. On appeal, the union argued that the question of 
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1409, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960). 
7. 376 U.S. 543, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 84 
S.Ct. 909 (1964). 
8. 256 Cal. App.2d 255, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 760, (1967). 
9. The dispute was over the union's 
contention that under the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement the em-
ployer was obligated to pay typogra-
phers for certain make-work duties. 
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waiver was so related to the merits of the dispute that it would 
be inconsistent with federal principles, as declared in Wiley, to 
deny arbitration. The appellate court rejected the claim of 
inconsistency, however, on the basis of a statement in Wiley 
that a union "might abandon its right to arbitration by failing 
to make its claims known";lo and it affirmed the trial court's 
ruling, stating that under section 1281.2, the question of 
waiver was one of fact for the trial court to determine. 
It may be that it is not inconsistent in principle with 
federal law, as interpreted in Wiley, to allow waiver, in the 
sense of "abandonment" as a defense in an action to compel 
arbitration, and it may be that in the context of the particular 
facts of Silversun a finding of waiver, in that sense, did not 
conflict with any federal policy. But if the notion of federal 
uniformity is to have any meaning, then the definition of what 
constitutes "waiver", or "abandonment", must be regarded 
as ultimately a federal issue. For example, a defense based 
upon the failure of the party seeking arbitration to comply with 
contractual time limits in processing the grievance poses pre-
cisely the type of issue which the Supreme Court in Wiley held 
must be referred to arbitration; and for a state court to hold 
that such non-compliance constituted "waiver" of the right to 
arbitrate would be contrary to federal policy. Thus, the 
appellate court's characterization of the waiver issue as one of 
fact for the trial court, without reference to federal principles, 
could not be sustained. 
Assertion of Individual Rights under a Labor Agreement 
What might be regarded as a sub-category of section 301 
actions, and in any event closely related to them, are those 
cases in which a member of a bargaining unit seeks relief 
against his union, his employer, or both on the ground that 
he was wrongfully denied some benefit under a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
In Vaca v. Sipes,11 the Supreme Court held that such 
10. 376 U.S. at 551, II L.Ed.2d at 11. 386 U.S. 171, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, 87 
905, 84 S Ct at -. S.Ct. 903 (1967). 
548 CAL LAW 1969 
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actions are maintainable in federal or state courts as section 
301 actions, without regard to potential NLRB jurisdiction. 
However, to succeed in the face of a defense that he has 
failed to exhaust contractual arbitration remedies, an em-
ployee must prove that the union, as bargaining agent, 
breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the 
employee's grievance.12 And to do that, he must demon-
strate that the union's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or in bad faith. 
Vaca v. Sipes involved a union's refusal to process an em-
ployee's grievance beyond the labor-management grievance 
machinery to third-party arbitration. Last year in Pratt v. 
Local 683,13 a California court applied the doctrine of that 
case to rescue from summary judgment and demurrer a 
complaint which alleged that the plaintiff's union had proc-
essed his wrongly discharged grievance through the second 
step of the grievance procedure, but had done so in an in-
competent manner, resulting at that point in a unanimous 
decision against him by the grievance committee. That, in 
itself, would be insufficient to state a cause of action under 
federal rules, but the complaint also alleged that the union 
acted "wilfully and in bad faith", and affidavits filed on the 
motion for summary judgment alleged personal animosity on 
the part of the union representative. Though the complaint 
was filed prior to the decision in Vaca, the appellate court 
held that these allegations were sufficient to create a factual 
issue under the rule of that case, in a cause of action against 
the union and its representative, and overruled the summary 
judgment which had been granted by the trial court. At the 
same time, the appellate court reversed judgment on a de-
murrer to a cause of action against the employer for wrongful 
discharge, stating that plaintiff should be given an opportunity 
to reframe his complaint under the Vaca rule against the em-
ployer as well. 
12. See Steele v. Louisville & Nash- 13. 260 Cal. App.2d 545, 67 Cal. 
ville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 89 L.Ed. Rptr. 483 (1968). 
173,65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). 
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Plaintiffs in Archuleta v. Grand Lodge14 did not fare as 
well. They had been employed by Douglas Aircraft Company 
at its EI Segundo plant, in a bargaining unit represented by the 
International Association of Machinists. The work was trans-
ferred to the company's Long Beach plant, where it was 
being performed by employees in a bargaining unit represented 
by a different union, and they were terminated as a result. 
The lAM filed a grievance on their behalf, claiming that the 
work transfer was in violation of the applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the grievance was processed to third-
party arbitration; but the arbitrator sustained the company's 
position that no violation had occurred. 
After some abortive litigation and several amended com-
plaints, plaintiffs, suing pro per, filed a complaint which alleged 
that the arbitration award was the product of fraud and col-
lusion between the company and the union, and that on the 
merits they were entitled to relief. Both the company and the 
union were named as defendants, but only the union. was 
served, and the company did not appear. The union's de-
murrer was sustained without leave to amend, and the em-
ployees appealed. 
The appellate court treated the complaint as a petition to 
set aside an arbitration award, or alternatively to obtain 
money damages against the union for fraud. As to the first 
theory, the court held the plaintiffs had not met the require-
ments of the California Arbitration Act, providing that a 
petition to set aside an arbitration award must be brought 
by a party to the arbitration proceeding, and must be filed 
within 100 days of service of the award.16 (The action before 
the court was instituted three years after service of the award 
on the union.) As to the second theory, the court held the 
complaint failed to allege the essential elements of fraud under 
the California law, and it affirmed the judgment of dismissal. 
While the result may be defensible, the decision is de-
fective in a number of respects, primarily in its assumption 
that the issue was resolvable under the state law without regard 
14. 262 Cal. App.2d 202, 68 Cal. 15. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1288. 
Rptr. 694 (1968). 
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one against the union for damages arising out of an alleged 
breach of its duty of fair representation, under the doctrine 
of Vaca v. Sipes. The provision of the California Arbitration 
Act to the effect that only parties to an arbitration proceeding 
may petition to set aside an award clearly cannot be applied 
to preclude relief in such a situation consistent with federal 
law. Moreover, since the company was not joined as de-
fendant, and since it was a necessary party to any action to 
set aside the arbitration award between it and the union, the 
court's consideration of the action as being in part for that 
purpose was unnecessary. Indeed, it may be that joinder of 
the company is required under Vaca, but leaving that issue 
aside the questions were, or should have been, whether the 
complaint was timely filed and, if so, whether it alleged with 
sufficient specificity the elements of a breach of statutory duty 
by the union in the process of obtaining the award. 
On the timeliness issue, the federal act contains no statute 
of limitations, and it has been held that resort to California's 
three-year limitation period on suits to enforce statutory rights 
is proper.IS It is difficult to determine from the court's opinion 
whether that test was met. Although the suit was filed within 
three years after the date of service of the arbitration award, 
the acts complained of presumably preceded the award itself. 
It is also difficult to determine from the opinion whether the 
allegations were sufficient to meet federal standards under 
Vaca, since they are not set forth in detail; the most that can 
be said is that the court's analysis in terms of fraud pleadings 
should not have been determinative. 
Public Employees 
Governmental bodies are expressly excluded from coverage 
under the Taft-Hartley Act, and it is here that there is the 
greatest room, and the greatest need, for legal creativity at 
the state level. Unfortunately, the quality of public dis-
16. International U. of Op. Eng. v. 384 U.S. 904, 16 L.Ed.2d 358, 86 S.Ct. 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936, 1336. 
19 A.L.R.3d 1026 (1965), cert. den. 
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cussion in this area is often distorted by an overemphasis upon 
the right-to-strike issue. Whatever is eventually decided on 
the right of public employees to strike, still an unsettled ques-
tion under California law,17 it is doubtful that any effective 
means can be found to deter public employees from quitting 
their jobs and picketing when they become sufficiently dis-
satisfied with their conditions of employment to do SO.18 What 
is of at least equal signficance is the legal-institutional context 
in which disputes between such employees and their employers 
may be resolved, for it is that context, more than rules relating 
to the legality of strikes, which is likely to determine whether 
work stoppages will in fact occur. 
The principal obstacle to effective labor relations within 
the public sector has been the dogma that public employment 
is unique, and that principles from the private sector cannot 
or should not be applied. There are differences, to be sure, 
but these are often exaggerated. The modern trend is to-
ward extending the institutions, attitudes, and techniques 
which have been developed in private industry to government 
employees. 
California has responded to these changes, but slowly. In 
1961 the legislature adopted Chapter 10 of the Government 
Code,I9 which, in language reminiscent of LMRA, declares 
the right of public employees to form, join, and participate in 
the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing 
for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-
employee relations, and the right of such organizations to 
represent "their members" in such matters. The chapter 
prohibited public agencies from interfering with these rights, 
and required them "to meet and confer" upon request of em-
ployee organizations and to consider "as fully as (they) deem 
reasonable" such presentations as are made by the employee 
organizations on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a 
determination. However, no provision was made for selection 
17. See In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 137, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 (1968). 
For a further discussion of this case, 
see York, REMEDIES, and Leahy, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
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of bargaining representatives, or for exclusive representation. 
It was unclear to what extent the obligation of an agency to 
"meet and confer" implied good faith negotiations leading to 
an agreement, as distinguished from the unilateral considera-
tion of proposals; and no machinery was created for dealing 
with disputes. Moreover, the statutory declaration of purpose 
contained an exceedingly ambiguous sentence to the effect that 
nothing in the statute was to be deemed to supersede "the 
provisions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, 
and rules of local public agencies which establish and regulate 
a merit or civil service system or which provide for other 
methods of administering employer-employee relations."2o 
Through amendments to Chapter 10 adopted in 1968, the 
legislature clarified the situation somewhat for employees of 
public bodies other than the state. Public agencies are now 
expressly required, except in cases of emergency, to notify 
employee organizations of proposed action affecting their 
members to give them an opportunity to meet in advance. The 
phrase "meet and confer" was changed to "meet and confer 
in good faith", and the latter defined to mean "the mutual 
obligation personally to meet and confer in order to exchange 
freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor 
to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representa-
tion". If agreement is not reached, the parties may agree 
upon a mediator, and share the costs of mediation. 
Prior to the amendments, the statute authorized public 
agencies to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the 
administration of employer-employee relations under Chapter 
10, and enumerated several subjects which were covered. 
Under the 1968 amendments, the rules and regulations may 
be adopted only after "consultation in good faith" with em-
ployee organization representatives, and the list of suggested 
topics is expanded to include recognition of employee organ-
izations and additional procedures for the resolution of dis-
putes involving "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment.,,1 
20. Cal. Gov. Code § 3500. 1. Cal. Gov. Code § 3505. 
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While the 1968 amendments are an improvement, they 
still leave important questions unanswered. The most critical 
of these is the representation issue: a governmental employer 
is now required to confer in good faith with a "recognized em-
ployee organization" but that term is defined redundantly to 
mean one "which has been formally acknowledged by the 
public agency as an employee organization that represents 
employees of the public agency", 2 and no standards are pro-
vided for determining when such acknowledgment should be 
granted or withheld. If the legislature contemplated that more 
than one employee organization might be recognized in the 
same unit of employees, then the bargaining process becomes 
exceedingly complicated. If the legislature contemplated that 
only one employee organization would be recognized for each 
bargaining unit, as in the case of private industry, then public 
agencies must improvise, for the statute provides no criteria 
for determining what units are appropriate, nor for deter-
mining whether a particular employee organization in fact 
represents a majority of employees in a particular unit. 
In the case of teachers, special legislation known as the 
Winton Ace attempts to resolve the representation issue 
through establishment of "negotiating councils" composed of 
delegates from each teacher organization, the number of 
delegates being determined by the number of members. In 
Berkeley Teachers Association v. Berkeley Federation of 
Teachers4 decided last year, the Winton Act was interpreted 
to preclude the conduct of an election to determine the pro-
portionate representation of each organization. The court 
held that representation was to be determined on the basis 
of membership rosters alone. An election to require the 
teachers to choose, the court ruled, would amount to an 
"unwarranted interference with the relationship between the 
employee organization and its members"; and it expressly 
rejected the argument that the act was designed to adapt 
private sector labor law to the public sector. It is apparent 
2. Cal. Gov. Code § 3501(b). 4. 254 Cal. App.2d 660, 62 Cal. 
3. Cal. Education Code §§ 13080- Rptr. 515 (1967). 
13088; Cal. Gov. Code § 3501. 
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that further legislation will eventually be required in the public 
sector, for the situation at present is too ambiguous to be 
workable. Meanwhile, it can be expected that the current 
ambiguity will give rise to ample decisional material for next 
year's Trends and Developments . 
... 
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